This analysis sets out Tretiakov Consulting’s perspective on three questions that matter to any foreign investor or operator considering the Kazakh logistics market: the logistics infrastructure segments with the strongest growth and investment potential, Kazakhstan’s principal logistics corridors and their demand drivers, and the major developments and watchpoints that will shape the market over the coming years. It is based on publicly available information as of 10 October 2026 and provides a market-level perspective rather than an asset-level commercial, operational or investment assessment.

Kazakhstan, for its part, is in the middle of a large transport investment programme, with KTZ alone planning KZT 7.9 trn of infrastructure spending to 2029. The programme aims to raise transit volumes and to strengthen the country's role as an overland link between China, Central Asia and Europe. The market is therefore at a point when much of the new capacity is being commissioned but its commercial results are not yet visible.

Each section sets out what the evidence shows, explains what it suggests and identifies what public data does not establish. Figures are actual results unless they are marked as a plan, target or estimate, and maps and diagrams are schematic. Projects carry one of five statuses, because these stages differ materially for an investor: operational, under construction, financed or committed, announced, and target. Figures in the text link to their sources, which are listed in full at the end, and the Annex explains which figure we use where sources disagree.

Summary

Kazakhstan's logistics market is expanding alongside a major infrastructure build-out, but cargo growth and capacity utilisation vary considerably by corridor, asset and cargo segment. The strongest observable growth is in container traffic through the Caspian ports and on Chinese rail transit to Central Asia, while several announced projects would add capacity well ahead of the volumes demonstrated so far.

Segments with the strongest growth and investment potential. Most capital is going into rail lines, with smaller amounts in Caspian port terminals and fund-backed logistics parks. Operating growth, by contrast, is concentrated in container handling at the Caspian ports and in the China–Central Asia rail flow that passes through the gauge-change stations. Container traffic through Kazakhstan's seaports rose 29% to 90,637 TEU in 2025, and rail freight across the China border grew 9.2% in the first half of 2026. Published throughput at the Caspian ports remains below their aggregate nameplate capacity, although utilisation differs by cargo type and facility. In each of these segments, terminal economics depend on constraints beyond the terminal itself, including water depth, vessel availability, rail-interface performance and committed cargo volumes.

Key logistics corridors and the demand drivers behind them. The largest flows are China–Kazakhstan–Central Asia trade, Kazakhstan–Russia rail traffic, which reached 92.1 Mt in 2025, and Kazakhstan's own commodity exports. The Northern route through Russia still carries most overland China–EU rail cargo, although its volumes fell in both directions in 2025. The Trans-Caspian route carried 4.12 Mt in 2025, 8% less than in 2024, while its container traffic rose 36%, and most of its cargo is regional rather than China–EU. Growth in 2026 has coincided with continued disruption to shipping in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, and public data does not allow the resulting rerouted volumes to be isolated.

Major developments, emerging trends and key watchpoints. The 2026 to 2028 period will see several major capacity additions commissioned. The Moiynty–Kyzylzhar and Darbaza–Maktaaral lines and the dredging of Aktau port are scheduled for the end of 2026. Construction of the third China crossing at Bakhty is due for completion at the end of 2027, with operations from 2028, and the second phase of the Aktau container hub is announced for 2027 to 2028. Regulation is changing at the same time, as rail infrastructure tariffs rise by 18% to 24% a year until 2030, the network prepares to open to independent operators from 2027 and a partial listing of KTZ is planned. The main watchpoints are whether cargo keeps pace with new capacity, the persistence of volumes linked to shipping disruptions, the falling level of the Caspian Sea, KTZ's financing, the competing China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and sanctions exposure in Russia-linked flows.

1. Market at a glance

Freight volumes are large and growing at a moderate pace. Transit is growing faster than total rail freight, and the official targets assume a much faster rise than recent results show.

Note: Kazakhstan publishes several transit series that are not equivalent. The all-mode figure of 36.9 Mt, KTZ's rail transit of 33.0 Mt and a customs-based figure of 23.1 Mt for 2025 measure different things and should not be compared directly, as the Annex explains.

Source: Government of Kazakhstan, Ministry of Transport, KTZ, Bureau of National Statistics via Ranking.kz

Source: Government of Kazakhstan, inbusiness.kz, Kazinform

What the evidence suggests. Reaching the 2026 target would require growth of about 49% over 2025 on an all-mode basis, or about 67% if the target refers to KTZ rail transit. Growth in the first half of 2026 was strong, but even if the second half matched the first, all-mode transit would reach about 43 Mt, some 12 Mt short of the target. According to the Government, by June 2026 KTZ had carried 16 Mt against 23 Mt planned, or about 70% of plan.

The acceleration in 2026 coincides with the disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz from late February. Public data does not show how much of the increase is cargo diverted from sea routes and how much reflects underlying demand.

Operating environment. Kazakhstan ranks 79th of 139 in the World Bank's Logistics Performance Index 2023, and Exhibit 4 shows its position on each component. Its lowest ranks are 93rd for timeliness and 91st for international shipments, while its lowest score is 2.5 for infrastructure. Timeliness reflects how often shipments arrive within the expected time, and international shipments reflects how easily competitively priced shipments can be arranged. Both depend on the whole chain rather than on a single asset, so the index points to weaknesses in service reliability as well as in physical infrastructure. It does not show where along the chain delays arise, and the 2023 edition, the latest available, predates most of the capacity commissioned since 2025.

Source: World Bank Logistics Performance Index 2023

What public data does not establish. Public data does not establish how much of the volume is committed under long-term contracts or what the origin and destination of cargo are by commodity. It also leaves open how the different transit series relate to each other, which makes plan-versus-actual comparisons sensitive to the series chosen.

2. Corridors and demand drivers

The largest and most durable flows link China, Kazakhstan, Russia and Central Asia. The Trans-Caspian route is growing fastest in containers, but it remains small in tonnage and carries mostly regional cargo. Exhibit 5 shows the main corridors, including the Caspian sea legs and the lines now under construction. Four of the five corridors carry cargo that enters at the China border, so conditions at the border crossings described in Section 3 affect part of the flow on each of them. Exhibit 6 compares the latest volumes on each corridor.

Source: Tretiakov Consulting based on KTZ, Ministry of Transport, ERAI via Upply, kt.kz and Akchabar. Schematic, not to scale

Source: Kazinform, Kapital.kz, Astana Times, Times of Central Asia, kt.kz and ERAI via Upply

Source: KTZ, ERAI via Upply, Ministry of Transport, Kazinform, kt.kz, Times of Central Asia, Trend

How the Trans-Caspian route works. A container on the route travels by Kazakh rail to Aktau or Kuryk, passes through the port yard onto a vessel or ferry, crosses the Caspian to the port of Baku at Alat, and continues by Georgian rail to the Black Sea ports or Türkiye before it reaches European networks. Each of these stages is run by a different party, so the reliability of the whole route is set by its weakest link rather than by Kazakh infrastructure alone. Exhibit 8 shows the chain and the constraints that public sources record at each stage.

Source: Tretiakov Consulting based on primeminister.kz, Moscow Times, Ports Europe, EBRD, Kazinform, KMTF, Times of Central Asia, Trend, PMCG and CACI Analyst

Tonnage on the Kazakh section rose from 2.76 Mt in 2023 to 4.48 Mt in 2024, then fell to 4.12 Mt in 2025 against a plan of 5.2 Mt, and the same 5.2 Mt is the plan for 2026. Container traffic moved the other way, rising 36% in 2025 while tonnage fell 8%. The divergence matters for terminal operators, because aggregate tonnage understates the growth in container handling. Route capacity is about 6 Mt and is planned to reach 10 Mt, and the official container target of 300k TEU by 2029 would require roughly a fourfold increase from the 2025 level.

Source: Ministry of Transport, Interfax, Report.az

The route should not be seen primarily as a China–Europe transit proposition. PMCG data for the Georgian section covers all Middle Corridor transit through Georgia and is therefore a wider statistical base than the Kazakh section. On that base, EU–China cargo was about 30 kt in 2025, under 1% of the 4.61 Mt total, and regional trade between Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Central Asia and the EU made up most of the flow. Since China–EU cargo on the route normally continues from Baku through Georgia, the Georgian data also indicates the scale of China–EU cargo on the Kazakh section. Before 2022 the Middle Corridor carried only 2% to 3% of overland China–EU containers. A regional cargo base reduces dependence on a single long-haul flow, but it also means that different terminals face different cargo mixes.

Source: PMCG, Middle Corridor Monitor, 2026

Demand drivers. Exhibit 11 separates the structural drivers of demand from the cyclical and event-driven ones. The persistence column reflects our assessment rather than a forecast.

Source: Interfax-Kazakhstan, KTZ, Astana Times, Halyk Finance, Government of Kazakhstan, Times of Central Asia, DKNews, Lada.kz, Eurasianet, Seatrade Maritime, Straits.live, PMCG

Published scenarios and targets. Several institutions have published scenarios, targets and funding envelopes for the region. Exhibit 12 sets them side by side, but they cover different geographies, metrics and horizons and are not forecasts on a common basis.

Exhibit 12. Published scenarios and targets

The World Bank scenario of 11 Mt by 2030 is about 2.7 times the 4.12 Mt carried on the Kazakh section in 2025, although the two figures may not share the same scope.

What the evidence suggests

• The Trans-Caspian route currently functions as a regional and export corridor, so long-haul China–EU transit is an upside rather than the base case.

• Part of the growth in 2026 coincides with shipping disruptions and may not persist, although public data does not isolate it. For long-lived terminal assets, the structural drivers in Exhibit 11 matter more.

• At the Central Asia–Japan summit in December 2025, President Tokayev stated that more than 80% of overland Asia–Europe cargo passes through Kazakhstan. No alternative estimate of this share has been published.

What public data does not establish. Public data does not establish the door-to-door cost, transit-time reliability or tariff stability of each route compared with its alternatives. Nor does it show the origin and destination of cargo by shipper, the split between committed and rerouted volumes, or container imbalances and empty repositioning on each lane. Without this information, the volume figures above say little about the commercial attractiveness of any single route.

3. China border gateways and the rail network

Line capacity on the China axis has risen sharply since 2025, while capacity at the border stations where cargo changes gauge is still being expanded. Exhibit 13 shows the main network together with the projects completed since 2025 and those still under construction.

Source: Tretiakov Consulting based on Kursiv, Kapital.kz, KTZ, Times of Central Asia and Spot.uz. Schematic, not to scale

Why the border stations matter. Because every China–Kazakhstan rail movement requires a gauge change and train formation in the yard, growth in mainline capacity does not translate into equivalent growth in throughput unless transshipment, yard and train-formation capacity at Dostyk and Altynkol grow as well. Recent works at the stations are consistent with this: four additional 1,435 mm tracks and a hump yard are nearing completion at Altynkol, and the Bakhty crossing will add a third transfer point from 2028. Exhibit 14 summarises the chain and the evidence available at each stage.

Source: Tretiakov Consulting based on Astana Times, Kapital.kz, KTZ, KTZ Express, Kursiv and the KTZ listing application

Source: Astana Times, KTZ, Kapital.kz, KTZ listing application

Khorgos Gateway. The dry port is owned 51% by KTZ Express and 24.5% each by COSCO Shipping and an investment company of Jiangsu Lianyungang Port. Its capacity was raised from 540k to 800k TEU a year in September 2025, and throughput in 2025 was over 372k TEU, up 2%. As Exhibit 16 shows, this equals about 69% of the capacity in place for most of the year and 47% of the expanded capacity. The gap should not be read as simple overcapacity, because the expansion came late in the year and effective throughput also depends on gauge-change operations, train availability, border processing and the capacity of connecting rail sections. Throughput since the expansion has not been published, and the only equipment delivery on public record is a Kalmar fleet supplied in 2015.

Source: KTZ Express and KTZ

Source: Kursiv, Kapital.kz, KTZ, Times of Central Asia, Spot.uz

Kazakhstan laid 911 km of new track in 2025, consisting of the Dostyk–Moiynty second track and the Almaty bypass. The programme to 2029, often cited as 5,000 km, combines about 1,700 km of new lines with the modernisation of existing track. Even so, 68.5% of the 16,000 km network is single-track, which means that capacity added on individual sections can still be limited elsewhere on the network.

The available evidence points to network capacity rather than rolling stock as the tighter constraint. In March 2026 KTZ restricted the registration of new wagons because their number exceeded what the network could handle. Locomotive supply is being addressed separately, as Wabtec supplies 300 locally built locomotives and services 405 locomotives until 2058 under a USD 4.2 bn agreement. Border processing has also become faster, as automatic release of transit declarations has cut clearance time per train from three hours to 30 minutes.

What the evidence suggests

• On the China axis, line capacity has been expanded ahead of gauge-change capacity. Dostyk–Moiynty now allows 60 train pairs a day and Altynkol–Zhetygen 33, while the new 1,435 mm tracks and hump yard at Altynkol are still being completed.

• Khorgos capacity rose 48% in September 2025, too late to be tested by 2025 throughput, which grew 2%. Public data does not yet show how far the expanded capacity is used, or whether cargo availability, train allocation or the Chinese side would limit it.

• The Bakhty crossing will require gauge-change transshipment from 2028, but no design, operator or procurement for it has been announced.

What public data does not establish. Public sources disclose capacity and throughput at the border, but they provide little visibility on transshipment rates, dwell times, yard utilisation, equipment availability or train allocation on the Chinese side. These metrics would be needed to determine whether the constraints observed at the border relate to infrastructure or to operations. It is also not known how nominal capacity at Khorgos and the border stations is calculated, or who will hold operating responsibility at Bakhty.

4. Caspian ports and shipping

Published throughput at Kazakhstan's Caspian ports remains below their aggregate nameplate capacity, while container handling is growing quickly from a small base. The pace of that growth depends on the whole chain from the rail approach to the vessel, and not only on quay capacity. Exhibit 18 shows the ports on both sides of the sea and the links between them.

Source: Tretiakov Consulting based on EBRD, 24.kz, KTZ, Korabel.ru, Trend, Baird Maritime, bne IntelliNews, Special Eurasia and Astana Times. Schematic, not to scale

Source: KTZ, EBRD, 24.kz, Argus, Lada.kz, Kazinform, Times of Central Asia

How the port chain works. Cargo reaches Aktau and Kuryk by rail or road, is stored and handled in the port yard, and is loaded at the berth onto a container ship, a ferry or a bulk vessel bound for the port of Baku at Alat, Turkmenbashi or Iranian ports. Public sources record constraints at several of these stages, as Exhibit 8 shows. On the approach, dispatch to Kuryk was suspended in June 2025 after more than 1,000 wagons accumulated, and KTZ restricted grain shipments to Aktau in October 2025. At the berth, shallow water limits vessel loading to about 75%, and at sea the national carrier operates three container ships of 350 TEU each. Public data does not show the relative weight of each constraint, which may also change from season to season.

Oil still makes up most of Aktau's tonnage, as Exhibit 20 shows, which is why aggregate port capacity says little about the capacity available for containers.

Source: Aktau port via Lada.kz

Container volumes at Aktau are growing fast. Annualising September 2026 gives about 122k TEU, close to the 140k TEU capacity of the hub's first phase, although this is an illustration from a peak month and the split between the hub and the port's other berths is not published. Announced projects would add much more: the second phase of the hub and the Rhenus terminal alone would take container capacity at Aktau to at least 390k TEU, against 63k TEU handled in 2025.

Source: Argus, 24.kz, KTZ, Government of Kazakhstan, Container News. Capacity at other Aktau berths is not included

Source: Government of Kazakhstan, KTZ listing application, EBRD, Times of Central Asia, Lada.kz, Orda.kz, Container News, Kapital.kz, Astana Times

Shipping. The national carrier KMTF carried about 80% of Aktau–Baku container traffic in 2025, with its three 350-TEU ships. Six container vessels are due for Kazakh carriers in 2027 and 2028, and eight dry-cargo vessels by the end of 2028. AD Ports Group, which has a 51/49 shipping joint venture with KMTF, is financing two container ships, and public sources do not show whether these are among the six vessels due.

Water level. The Kazakh sector of the Caspian averaged minus 29.35 m (Baltic datum) in 2025, more than 2 m below its 2006 level, and Kazhydromet expects the decline to continue, as Exhibit 23 shows. Depth gained by dredging will therefore erode over time. Annual bottom cleaning at Aktau already costs about KZT 0.4 bn, and public sources do not show who will bear recurring dredging costs.

Source: Kazhydromet via Astana Times

Ports across the Caspian. The port of Baku at Alat is the counterpart for most Kazakh container and ferry traffic. It handled over 107k TEU in 2025 and is seeking international operators for its expansion. Turkmenbashi has 17 Mt and 400k TEU of rated capacity, and its utilisation is put at about 43% by one source and at 25% to 30% by another. With this spare capacity, it competes with Aktau and Kuryk for transit flows. Russia is promoting a link between Makhachkala and Kuryk, and an agreement on the route was signed in June 2026 with trial shipments planned.

What the evidence suggests

• Tonnage and containers are moving at different speeds. Aktau shipped 4.9 Mt in 2025 against a rated capacity of 11.8 Mt, and oil made up three quarters of its tonnage in January to May 2026. Its container volumes, by contrast, set a record in September 2026, although the split between the hub and the port's other berths is not published.

• Announced container capacity at Aktau is several times current throughput, so the commercial case for each new terminal depends on how quickly committed volumes follow.

• New capacity is being built or planned by investors of different kinds, namely the port groups Lianyungang and AD Ports, the logistics group Rhenus, the materials group Guoyou and the local developer Semurg. Chinese firms lead construction, equipment supply and dredging.

What public data does not establish. Public sources disclose capacity and throughput at the ports, but they provide little visibility on berth productivity, equipment availability, yard utilisation, dwell times or vessel turnaround. These metrics would be needed to determine whether the constraints described above relate to infrastructure or to operations. Public data also does not establish how volumes for new terminals are committed and by whom, how operating responsibility and equipment ownership are split between the state port, joint ventures and private investors, or whether port tariffs are regulated.

5. Inland terminals, warehousing and e-commerce

Inland, the container terminal layer is thin and largely controlled by KTZ and its partners. Vacancy in logistics real estate is low in Astana and in Class A space nationally, but it is rising in Almaty and is concentrated in buildings delivered since 2023.

Inland terminals

• KTZ operates seven terminals on international routes and plans seven more, including Kokshetau and Kostanay.

• The ZHETYSU terminal in Almaty, with a capacity of 115k TEU a year, was developed by Kedentransservice with Xi'an Free Trade Port and opened in June 2025.

• In January 2026 Rhenus acquired the QAZContargo terminal at Baiserke near Almaty, its first wholly owned terminal in Kazakhstan.

• Private carriers hold about 5% of the rail freight market, and the network is due to open to independent operators from 2027.

Warehousing. Exhibit 24 shows vacancy by segment from different brokers, whose scopes and dates differ.

Source: IBC Global and IBC Real Estate, Bright Rich, Logistics News. The figures differ in scope and date and are not directly comparable

Vacancy in Almaty rose from under 1% at the start of 2024 to 13.3% in May 2026, and Class A asking rents in the city fell by 5.9% over the same period. Across Kazakhstan, 67% of empty space is in buildings delivered between 2023 and 2025. In Astana, by contrast, vacancy is about 3% and brokers estimate a shortage of 350k to 400k m².

Quality stock is put at 2.21 mn m² at the start of 2026 and 2.38 mn m² at the end of June, but the two figures come from different releases and should not be read as a change in stock. Only about 40k m² was delivered in the first half of 2026, with over 100k m² expected in the second half, against an IBC forecast of 586k m² for 2026 made in November 2025. Market reports attribute the slowdown to high financing costs and to building costs about 1.5 times the 2021 level. New projects are increasingly fund-led, such as the USD 125 mn Class A+ park near Almaty that Griffin Partners is building with financing from the Eurasian Development Bank.

E-commerce. Online sales of goods reached KZT 3.8 trn, about USD 8 bn, in 2025, up 19.4% and equal to 14.3% of retail trade, with marketplaces accounting for about 86% of the total. Russian marketplaces are also expanding fulfilment in Kazakhstan, as noted in Exhibit 11.

What the evidence suggests

• The inland terminal layer is small and concentrated, and the only Western entry so far was the purchase of an operating terminal.

• Warehousing is a development and leasing business that is increasingly financed through funds, and its near-term balance differs sharply between Almaty and Astana.

• Part of the current fulfilment demand comes from the relocation of Russian marketplace operations, which raises questions of durability and compliance screening.

What public data does not establish. Public data does not establish the throughput or utilisation of inland terminals, whose capacity is mostly undisclosed. Nor does it show absorption, pre-leasing or tenant mix in the warehouse market, or the share of e-commerce flows that is re-exported.

6. Market structure and framework

Core ports and the main rail network are state-held. Foreign participants have entered through joint ventures, contracts or wholly owned assets at the edge of the network. None of them owns the main rail network or a state seaport, although Lianyungang Port Group holds 51% of the new Aktau container hub.

Ownership of core assets

• Samruk-Kazyna owns 100% of KTZ and must retain at least 75% after any listing. The main rail network is a strategic object, which gives the state a pre-emptive right and requires a Government resolution for any disposal. Access and terminal tracks, by contrast, may be privately owned.

• In March 2025 a court returned a privatised rail line serving Aktau port to state ownership.

• In November 2023 the Government said it was ready to place Aktau and Kuryk under private trust management in exchange for guaranteed throughput, and it also mentioned possible share sales on a ship-or-pay basis. The subject was discussed with the European Commission in January 2024, but no transaction has followed. Whether the seaports are classed as strategic objects is not confirmed.

Source: AD Ports Group, KTZ listing application, AidData, Seatrade, Gulf News, Port Technology, Container News, ICE, Business Wire

Three models emerge from these cases: a 51/49 joint venture with a state company or local developer, a management or advisory contract, and a wholly owned asset at the edge of the network. In 2022 PSA, Maersk and MSC were discussed as possible investors in the Aktau hub, but none of them entered.

Exhibit 26. Regulatory and financial framework

Source: Moore Kazakhstan, KPMG, Times of Central Asia, Finratings, Mondaq, BES.media, KTZ listing application, Kapital.kz, Railway Journal, Fergana

Source: Tretiakov Consulting calculation based on Finratings.kz

On our calculation, the approved steps would take main-network tariffs to about 2.6 times their level before September 2026 by 2030, as Exhibit 27 shows. KTZ's tariff requests linked the increases to rising debt service, and its July 2026 request put interest costs for 2026 at KZT 310 bn, against KZT 44.9 bn in 2024. For cargo owners the same path raises the cost of rail transport, and its effect on volumes is not yet observable.

What the evidence suggests

• Any disposal of the main rail network requires a Government resolution and is subject to the state's pre-emptive right, and no state seaport has been sold or concessioned. The routes of entry observed so far are joint ventures, contracts and ownership of peripheral assets.

• Tax and PPP rules shape possible structures. The 26% threshold, if confirmed, bears directly on joint ventures with state entities, and in practice projects have been allocated through bilateral agreements rather than PPP tenders.

• KTZ is funding a large investment programme mainly with external finance, and both the tariff path and the planned listing are linked to that programme.

• Chinese contractors and financing packages form the main competitive background for construction and equipment supply.

What public data does not establish. Public data does not establish the criteria by which projects are allocated outside PPP tenders, or which rules apply to outsourcing operations on state-owned assets. It also leaves open the status of the 2023 trust-management offer and of DP World's 2018 agreements, the regulatory status of port tariffs and the tax position of specific structures under the 2026 Tax Code.

7. Outlook: developments, trends and watchpoints

The 2026 to 2028 period will show whether cargo keeps pace with the capacity now being commissioned. Exhibit 28 places the scheduled developments on a single timeline, and Exhibit 29 lists the indicators that will show how they play out.

Source: KTZ, Spot.uz, Railway Journal, Orda.kz, Government of Kazakhstan, Times of Central Asia, Finratings, Kapital.kz, Akchabar, Kazinform

Trends

• Containerisation is rising from a low base, but bulk cargo still dominates. The containerisation rate reached 8.5% in early 2026, yet oil made up three quarters of Aktau's tonnage in January to May 2026 and grain terminals continue to expand.

• Other Caspian ports have spare or growing capacity. Turkmenbashi competes with Aktau and Kuryk for transit flows, while Baku, the counterpart for most Kazakh traffic, is expanding and seeking international operators. Russia is also promoting a Makhachkala–Kuryk link, for which an agreement was signed in June 2026.

• Chinese investors and contractors are well established. In July 2026 KTZ signed agreements worth about USD 400 mn with Chinese companies.

• Global logistics groups are entering through joint ventures and peripheral assets. Besides AD Ports and Rhenus, Maersk confirmed interest in a joint service with KTZ in September 2026.

• Digitalisation is shortening border clearance. Automatic release of transit declarations has cut clearance time per train from three hours to 30 minutes, and the World Bank recommends a single transit document and an integrated rail and Caspian service as complements to new infrastructure.

• Regional trade is growing. Kazakh exports to Afghanistan in January to July 2026 already exceeded the 2025 total, adding to the regional flows described in Section 2.

Source: Sections 1 to 6 and Akchabar

Outlook to 2035

Looking ahead to 2035, Kazakhstan’s position in the Eurasian transport and logistics market will be determined less by further increases in nominal capacity than by the extent to which that capacity is actually utilised and by the efficiency of the transport chain as a whole. A significant share of the projects being implemented in 2025–2028, including the expansion of rail connections with China, the third border crossing at Bakhty, the development of container-handling capacity at Aktau and the renewal of the Caspian fleet, will by then have been in operation for several years, allowing their performance to be assessed on the basis of actual throughput, utilisation rates and commercial returns.

The principal sources of long-term demand are likely to remain Kazakhstan’s and other Central Asian countries’ trade with China, intra-regional trade, commodity exports and the continued containerisation of freight. The scale of China–Europe transit, by contrast, will depend on the competitiveness of routes through Kazakhstan relative to maritime transport and alternative overland corridors. Investment opportunities through 2035 will therefore depend primarily on the availability of a sustainable cargo base, the location and severity of specific bottlenecks within the transport system, and the ability of individual terminals, ports and logistics operators to generate acceptable returns as capacity expands and competition between routes intensifies.

This article addresses three questions: which segments of Kazakhstan’s logistics infrastructure offer the strongest potential for growth and investment; what are the country’s principal transport corridors and the factors driving demand for them; and which developments are likely to shape the market between 2026 and 2035 and therefore require continued monitoring. The analysis is based on data available as of 10 October 2026.

The findings show that cargo-base dynamics and capacity utilisation vary materially across corridors, assets and cargo categories. The fastest growth is currently being recorded in container handling at Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports and in the rail transit of Chinese cargo to Central Asia, while a number of announced projects envisage additional capacity substantially exceeding currently confirmed volumes. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route remains predominantly a regional corridor. The article also identifies the information that should be obtained before assessing a specific asset or determining an appropriate form of investment or participation.